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NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT:
THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM
INTRODUCTON
One of the most serious, yet most neglected, health issues facing the United
States today is the problem of nuclear waste disposal. 1 Ever-increasing energy
consumption, coupled with the spiraling cost of oil, has led to greater public
acceptance and use of nuclear energy. 2 Growing dependence on nuclear power
contains a significant drawback: generation of radioactive wastes at each stage
of nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, while production of lethal nuclear wastes continues,
no acceptable method of disposal is in use at present. 3
Despite the absence of adequate nuclear waste technology, management of
radioactive wastes has consistently received only haphazard attention from both
legislative and regulatory bodies. Relying upon the assumption that science
and technology will ultimately provide a nuclear waste solution, agencies at
both the state and federal levels have done little to manage increasing
accumulations of nuclear wastes. Thus, even if demand for nuclear energy
1. The major classes of nuclear wastes are:
High Level Wastes (HLW) are either intact fuel assemblies that are being discarded after
having served their useful life in a nuclear reactor (spent fuel) or the portion of the wastes
generated in the reprocessing of spent fuel that contain virually all of the fission products and
most of the actinides not separated out during reprocessing. These wastes are being considered
for disposal in geologic repositories or by other technical options designed to provide long-term
isolation of the wastes from the biosphere.
Transuranic (TRU) Wastes result predominantly from spent fuel reprocessing, the fabrication
of plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and, if it should occur, plutonium fuel fabrication
for recycle to nuclear reactors. TRU waste is material containing more than ten nanocuries of
transuranic activity per gram of material. These wastes would be disposed in a similar manner
to that used for high level waste disposal.
Low Level Wastes (LLW) contain less than ten nanocuries of transuranic containments per
gram of material, or they may be free of transuranic contaminants, require little or no shielding
have low, but potentially hazardous, concentration or quantities of radionuclides. Low level
wastes are generated in almost all activities involving radioactive materials and are presently
being disposed of by shallow land burial.
Uranium mine and mill tailings are the residues from uranium mining and milling operations
which contain low concentrations of naturally occurring radioactive materials. The tailings are
generated in very large volumes and are presently stored at the site of mining and milling
operations.
Gaseous effluents are released into the biosphere and become thereby diluted and dispersed.
The useful life of a nuclear power plant is 30-40 years. At the end of that time, decontamination
and decommissioning (D&D), an activity that congenerate significant quantities of wastes, must occur.
These wastes are voluminous, however, they are not unique and are categorized in the same manner
as explained above. See, generally: The Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on
Nuclear Waste Management, March 1979 [hereinafter cited as IRQ Report].
2. R. Stobaugh and D. Yergin, Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business
School at 7 (1979).
3. On February 12, 1980, President Carter set forth a proposed fifteen-year program for nuclear-waste
storage and disposal. In a message to Congress, the President stressed the technological inadequacy
and political unacceptability of past government efforts in this area. The plan proposed selection of
the first disposal site by 1985, with final completion date of 1995. It advocated continued, intensive
research and development on varying sites and disposal media; at the same time it recommended
cancellation of the test disposal facility located at Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant. By executive order, Mr. Carter established a nineteen-member State Planning Council, composed
of state governors and federal officials, to alleviate political pressures on the waste issue, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1980, at Al, Col. 1. See text accompanying notes 7-8, 63-85, infra.
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decreases after the Three Mile Island accident,4 the search for safe and reliable
disposal methods requires immediate legislative guidance. If reliance on nuclear
energy expands, the need for such waste disposal methods becomes even more
critical.
This note will consider the problem of nuclear waste management by first
reviewing the process of nuclear energy production. It will examine the existing
regulatory framework and its deficiencies in dealing with nuclear waste disposal.
The note will then discuss prospects for technological solutions for waste
disposal. Finally, it will recommend possibilities for legislative resolution of
the problem and review pending legislation.
WASTE GENERATION: A BYPRODUCT OF
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
The recent accident at Three Mile Island has heightened public concern
over the safety of harnessing atomic energy. Despite increased attention, one
of the most dangerous and problematic aspects of the nuclear industry, nuclear
waste disposal, remains neglected.
Radioactive wastes, unavoidable byproducts of nuclear power,5 are "[tihose
radioactive materials which are of sufficient potential hazard that they require
special care and are of no present economic value to the nuclear industry. ' '6
As nuclear power plants produce electricity, 7 they generate approximately
thirty tons of highly radioactive wastes each year.8 The lack of a definite
waste-management program has resulted in an ever-growing accumulation of
nuclear wastes, for which no disposal program has ever been formulated.
Yet, even more serious than the volume of the waste is its lethal character
derived from its radioactive nature.9 The exact cause-effect relationship of
exposure to radioactive materials is not readily identifiable because it often
4. N.Y.Times, Mar. 29, 1979, at 1, col. 2; N.Y.Times, Mar. 30, 1979, at 1, col.2; N.Y.Times, Mar. 31,
1979, at 1, col.3.
5. Bishop, Observations and Impressions on the Nature of Radioactive Waste Management Problems, Essays
on Issues Relevant to the Regulation of Radioactive Waste Management, NUREG-0412, 52 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NUREG-0412].
6. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report Assessing the Policies, Plans and Programs of the
Executive Branch for the Safe Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Produced in the Commercial
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Enclosure B, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1975).
7. Nuclear energy is produced in commercial reactors through the process of splitting uranium atoms
which releases energy in the form of heat. The "converter reactors" use the generated heat to boil
water, creating steam to turn large turbine shafts that generate the production of electricity. Because
ordinary or "light" water is used to control the heat and production of energy, the reactors are often
referred to as "light-water reactors." Present commercial reactors are referred to as "converter reactors"
because they convert fissionable fuel into energy; they are distinguished from "breeder reactors" which
can produce their own fuel. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Factsheet 12, Conventional Reactors [hereinafter
cited as DOE Factsheet].
8. See, e.g., Cohen, High-Level Radioactive Waste from Light Water Reactors, 49 Rev. Mod. Physics
1 (1977).
9. Toxicity is determined by the quantity of radioactive material; the concentration of radionuclides in
the waste, the half-lives of the radionuclides and the amount of exposure to the radioactive waste.
See, e.g., Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Considerations of
Environmental Protection Criteria for Radioactive Waste: Background Report 7 (1978).
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takes the human body years to manifest its reaction. 10 One known effect is
genetic damage which may take the form of uncontrolled cellular growth-that
is cancer. 1l There is no method for modifying the duration of toxicity of the
wastes; this unalterable period may be as long as a half million years.12
There are several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Wastes are unavoidably
produced at each of the many stages, including the mining of uranium, 13
the milling' 4 and enriching 15 of the uranium ore, and the fabricating' 6
of fuel rods. Wastes pose the most intricate conundrums at the "back-end"
of the fuel cycle, which involves waste management and decommissioning.
Most power plants operate on a three-year cycle, demanding that one-third
of the fuel rods be removed and replaced each year.17 The plants were
originally designed to temporarily store used fuel rods, called spent fuel, in
water-cooled pools 18 while some of the most intense, but short-lived, radioactivity
decays. The spent fuel would then be packaged and shipped to reprocessing
centers where the still useful fissionable fuel would be recovered. 19
The reprocessing option was indefinitely postponed in 1977 when President
Carter issued a directive expressly forbidding recycling of spent nuclear
10. Delayed reaction to radiation exposure has resulted in the failure of most to appreciate and understand
the magnitude of the inherent dangers of radioactivity. Further, once released into our biosphere, there
is little if anything that can be done to halt the spiraling effect of its damage. Radionuclides released
into the biosphere through air, water or soil contamination in very minor doses may enter into the
food chain and concentrate along the way to cause fatal damage to humans and lower life forms.
Different chemicals are often concentrated by an organism in different cells or organs, for example
calcium is concentrated in the bones, and iodine in the thyroid. Therefore even if a radioactive chemical
is diluted before being released into the biosphere it could be concentrated on the way up the food
chain. Two radionuclides are often cited as the most dangerous not only because of their abundance
and longevity but because strontium, like calcium, deposits in the bones, and cesium, like potassium,
in the muscles and nerves. Passing from living organism to living organism radioactive waste will
reappear in man's food chain at unpredictable times and places for centuries. See S. Novick, The
Careless Atom (1969).
11. Plutonium, one of the major byproducts of the nuclear fuel cycle, is among the most dangerous known
carcinogens. Today, more than thirty years after the nuclear holocausts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
the areas are plagued with extrordinary rates of leukemia and other cancers attributed to radiation
exposure. See NUREG-0412 supra note 5, at 60,67.
12. Id.
13. The uranium currently used in nuclear reactors is a rare isotope, uranium235, which comprises less
than one percent of common uranium ore. Uranium occurs in most rock: therefore, the nuclear fuel
cycle begins with an attempt to locate ore that is rich enough to mine, a concentration of approximately
two percent. Uranium is mined in a manner similar to that of coal, and many of the problems are
similar: scarred landscapes, disposal of removed materials, revegetation, poor working conditions and
dangers in the underground mines. See P. Ehrlich, A. Ehrlich and J. Holdren, Ecoscience (3d ed
1977) [hereinafter cited as Ecoscience].
14. The raw ore is then "milled" or concentrated into a product that is about eighty percent uranium.
This process leaves behind a large quantity of mildly radioactive and chemically toxic liquid wastes
and a solid residue referred to as "mill tailings." See: Comey, The Legacy of Uranium Tailings (1976).
15. The natural uranium that has been "milled" then undergoes an enrichment process to increase the
concentration of uranium2 3 5 from 0.7 percent to approximately three percent. This fuel-producing
process, "gaseous diffusion," converts the ore to gaseous uranium hexafluoride. The byproducts of this
stage of the fuel cycle, referred to as "tails," consist largely of uranium 2 38 See: Ecoscience supra note
13, at 434-435.
16. Converter reactors require, that the fuel be fabricated into solid pellets and placed within fuel rods.
This process, though not inherently environmentally perilous, is extremely delicate and contains the
potential for enormous danger without utmost exercise of caution. Id.
17. See, e.g., DOE Factsheet supra note 7.
18. Jakimo and Bupp, "Nuclear Waste Disposal: Not in My Backyard," Harvard Graduate Sch. Bus. Ad.
Tech. Rev., March-April 1978. The President's recently proposed fifteen-year program for waste disposal
(see note 3, supra) calls for storage of nuclear wastes in reactor-site cooling pools pending the operation
of a permanent disposal facility. Given the fact that these on-site pools have served in this capacity
for years, this proposal amounts to no more than tacit approval of the status quo. N.Y. Times, Feb.
13, 1980, at Al, col. 1. See also text accompanying notes 21-25, infra.
19. Bupp, "The Nuclear Stalemate," in Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard
Business School, 122, 127 (R. Stobaugh and D. Yergin eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Bupp].
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fuel. 20 This decision intensified the burden of discovering a nuclear waste
solution since previous research had relied on reprocessing to neutralize the
threat of spent fuel.
As a result of the termination of the reprocessing alternative, most
commercial wastes are accumulating at reactor sites. Such facilities were
originally designed to hold the equivalent of approximately five years of spent
fuel. 21 Consequently, the majority of nuclear power plants have redesigned
their aqueous cooling systems.22 This alteration involves racking the spent fuel
rods more closely. While allowing higher density storage, the re-racking process
significantly alters the waste-to-water safety ratio.23
Recent criticism of this technique by the President's Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island24 may soon curtail licensing of the re-racking
option. In any event, redesign of the holding tanks, at best, will only permit
temporary relief from the problem of spent fuel storage, as most on-site
facilities will be filled by 1985 and several by 1983.25
In addition to the wastes generated at reactor sites, the U.S. will soon be
receiving wastes generated at foreign nuclear power plants. Under its policy
for international cooperation on atomic power, the United States contracts to
receive nuclear wastes whenever power plants are sold to another nation.26 Once
again, the desire to restrain weapons proliferation has, unwittingly, intensified
the urgency of the waste management dilemma.
Notwithstanding the fact of limited storage space in the on-site cooling
systems, their use as de facto long-term repositories increases the threat of
leakage of toxic wastes because of the potential corrosion of the waste canisters.
This danger underscores the need for an alternative waste storage solution. A
waste management program must be initiated immediately.
DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Nuclear research and development in the United States originated under
the auspices of the U.S. Army during the Second World War. Led by Enrico
Fermi, this research resulted in the first manual atomic reaction at the
University of Chicago in 1942.27 The Manhattan Project, a top secret government
project designed to produce the atomic bomb, was unveiled with the bombing
of Hiroshima in August of 1945.
20. Directorate of Energy Research, U.S. Department of Energy, Draft Report of the Task Forces for
Review of Nuclear Waste Management 45, 48 (1978). Fears that reprocessed plutonium might be
used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or an illicit seizure by terrorists for manufacture of
atomic bombs prompted the presidential veto.
21. Bupp supra note 19, at 127.
22. Ecoscience, supra note 13, at 449.
23. As of early 1979, fifteen utilities received permission to increase their storage capacities. NRC,
Proceeding From the NRC-AEA Spent Fuel Storage Meeting (NUREG-0498) 11-12 (1978).
24. Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1979, at 38; N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
25. See Bupp supra note 19, at 128.
26. Id. Due to concerns that the export of nuclear technology leads to proliferation, some Carter
Administration officials have suggested that these nuclear exports be more closely supervised, reducing
or stripping the NRC of its power of review in this area. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1980, at A16, col.
2.
27. Bupp supra note 19, at 113.
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After the war, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.28 The
Act placed fissionable nuclear materials within the exclusive control of the
federal government and mandated a research and development program aimed
at the expansion of technical knowledge of nuclear theory and processes. 29 The
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established to assure continued scientific
progress regarding civilian uses of nuclear power. 30
In the early fifties, President Eisenhower launched an "Atoms for Peace"
program, thereby making a commitment to commercial use of nuclear
energy. 31 The resulting legislation replaced the 1946 Act and eliminated the
federal government's monopoly over civilian uses of nuclear materials. 32 Called
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,33 it gave the AEC the conflicting responsibilities
of both promoting atomic energy and protecting the public from its health
and safety dangers. 34
The AEC encouraged the growth of the atomic energy industry through
massive funding. 35 As a result, the first commercial atomic reactor succeeded
in generating electricity in 1957 at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. 36 American
utilities began ordering nuclear power plants in 1965.37 Today, there are
seventy-two reactors in operation in the United States, supplying the nation
with thirteen percent of its total output of electricity. 38
REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL:
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Scheme
Licensing for nuclear power generation has never been linked to the ability
to dispose of nuclear waste products. Indeed, not until 1973 did the AEC
request any type of legislated controls for waste disposal sites.39 Congress
responded by passing the Federal Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,40 which
was the first Congressional act explicitly addressing the nuclear waste issue.
28. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
29. Several corporations including Westinghouse Electric Corporation and General Electric Company
conducted research programs under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission during the period
1946-1954. Their work greatly enhanced the state of technology regarding construction and design of
nuclear reactors. Raymond L. Murray, Nuclear Energy: An Introduction to the Concepts, Systems
and Applications of Nuclear Processes (1975).
30. The legislative history for the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 compares the "perspective of 1946 and
that of 1954: It was commonly believed 8 years ago that the generation of useful power from atomic
energy was a distant goal, a very distant goal . . . .Statutory provisions which were in harmony with
the state of atomic development in 1946 are no longer consistent with the realities of atomic energy
in 1954." S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3456, 3458, 3459.
31. NUREG-0412 supra note 5, at 78.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
34. S. Rep. No. 95-164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 854,
855-857.
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(g), 2051 (1976).
36. Bupp supra note 19, at 114.
37. Id., at 115.
38. N.Y.Times, Oct. 31, 1979, at A22.
39. [1973] AEC Ann. Rep. 61, 62-63. Early regulatory policy consisted of a series of ad hoc decisions.
In 1970, the AEC undertook formalization of regulatory policy regarding radioactive wastes. The AEC
took over an experimental disposal site, developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, constructed
in an abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas. Political opposition necessitated discontinuance of the
Lyons project.
The policy elected to fill the vacuum advocated development of Retrievable Surface Storage
Facilities (RSSF); upon construction of a permanent federal repository, wastes would be transported
to that site for ultimate disposal. This proposal was incorporated into the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974. However, the EPA doubted that RSSF would actually be used on an interim basis, given
the financial investment required. See NUREG-0412 supra note 5, at 2-3.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976); 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313-5316 (1976).
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The 1974 Act abolished the AEC and split developmental and regulatory
functions between two new agencies. 41 The first of these, the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA), assumed the duties of developing
adequate waste technology and of creating proper disposal sites.42 The second
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Coimmission (NRC), was authorized to evaluate
waste disposal proposals 43 and to license waste disposal facilities.44
These reforms were short-lived, however. Shortly after passage of the 1974
Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rejected ERDA's nuclear
waste proposals. 45 This assessment rendered the Act ineffectual, for ERDA
was unable to propose a suitable alternative policy during its remaining years
of existence.46 The NRC, moreover, determined that Congress intended its
licensing authority to be prospective only.47 As a consequence, existing disposal
facilities remained unregulated.
The resulting policy vacuum was only partially filled by the passage of
the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977.48 which created the
Department of Energy (DOE). As successor to ERDA, the DOE inherited
ERDA's responsibilities regarding waste policy formulation. Supervision of
existing waste facilities and development of permanent disposal facilities were
also placed within the purview of the DOE.49 Regulatory responsibilities of
the NRC were left intact.
This new legislative framework has proven inadequate to resolve the waste
disposal stalemate. Only with regard to uranium mill tailings has remedial
action been taken for wastes generated during the nuclear fuel cycle. Passage
of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 197850 resulted in
prompt promulgation 5' of regulatory controls for the accumulating mill
wastes. 52 Hence, express legislative authorization appears to be the stimulus
necessary to spur progress toward ultimate waste disposal. 53
41. 42 U.S.C. § 5801(b) and (c) (1976).
42. The statutory delegation of authority did not specifically mention nuclear waste management. See 42
U.S.C. § 5813 (1976). ERDA, however, undertook the "responsibility of developing, demonstrating,
implementing and operating high-level radioactive waste repositories." Workshop Materials for State
Review of USNRC Site Suitability Criteria for High-level Radioactive Waste Repositories 17,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0326,
13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NUREG-03261.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 5842(3) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 5843(b) (1976).
44. Id. This licensing authority encompasses two stages: first, at construction and second, for operation.
45. NUREG-0412 at 3-5. The EPA criticized ERDA's proposals for temporary RSSF (see note 39,
supra).
46. ERDA was not specifically given authority to compose plans for nuclear waste disposal, outside of
those within the 1974 Act itself at 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976). For the areas of authority delegated
to ERDA, see 42 U.S.C. § 5813 (1976).
47. This decision was affirmed in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Administrator, 451 F. Supp. 1245
(D.D.C. 1978). The Court stated that the NRC licensing authority is triggered at that time when
sites are designated as part of ERDA's ultimate management plan for nuclear wastes. (42 U.S.C.
§ 5842(4) (1976).) A separate case, Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Reg., 582
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978), approved a decision by the NRC regarding regulation of temporary holding
tanks located near reactor sites. The cases may be distinguishable because of differences in NRC
authority to grant licenses for disposal sites, as opposed to licenses for operating reactors. Licensing
of reactors includes regulation of on-site holding tanks for safety, as well as for storage, purposes.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7351 (1977 Supp.).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a) (8) (C) (1977 Supp.).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7942 (West Supp. 1978).
51. See 44 Fed. Reg. 50,015 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 30.33, 40.1-40.32, 70.23, 150.3,
150.15, 150.31-150.32, 170.2-170.3).
52. Mill tailings contain, proportionately, only small amounts of naturally occurring radiation and thus
pose fewer technological unknowns in their disposal. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
25, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7433, 7452.
53. See IRG Report, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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B. Regulatory Framework
Existing agency regulations on management of nuclear wastes also reflect
the lack of comprehensive legislation on nuclear waste disposal. Regulations
presently in effect are cursory and limited in applicability, for none of the
disposal procedures outlined can safely accommodate highly irradiated wastes.
Current regulations pertain only to aqueous radioactive wastes created during
reprocessing 54 or to slightly contaminated wastes posing a less significant
environmental threat. 55
Recent pronouncements by the NRC, however, foreshadow the genesis of
effective regulatory policy on nuclear waste. For example, NRC regulations
of August 2, 1979, require that the socioeconomic consequences of nuclear
plants on local communities be assessed prior to licensing. 56 In addition, envi-
ronmental effects of nuclear wastes must now be analyzed as a condition to
NRC licensing of reactor construction. Furthermore, on October 25, 1979, tle
NRC published a proposed regulation relating development of waste storage
facilities to reactor licensing. 57
Despite such hopeful signs, fragmented legislative and regulatory policy
can only foster the impasse over nuclear waste disposal. 58 Three agencies-the
DOE, EPA and NRC-now share in regulation of the nuclear industry.
Congress has further complicated these agencies' exercise of delegated authority
by creating both overlaps and unnecessary constraints of functions. 59 As one
example, the DOE, while given primary responsibility over waste-policy formation,
is subject to the NRC's prerogative to provide advisory input.60 The weight
to be accorded such advice, however, depends on the discretion of the DOE.
As another example, EPA guidelines regarding acceptable levels of environmental
radioactivity measure the adequacy of both DOE programs and NRC regulations.
However, at this time EPA approval is impossible, for the agency has
promulgated no radiation protection standards for high-level waste disposal.61
Not until November 1978, in fact, did the EPA propose criteria simply defining
types of radioactive waste.62
54. 10 C.F.R., Part 50, Appendix F (1979).
55. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.301-20.305 (1979). Although the low concentrations of radioactivity of these wastes
do not pose grave technological problems, the lack of uniformity in both method and enforcement has
resulted in leakage problems. In recent years more than 3,000,000 cubic feet of low-level waste have
been buried annually. The IRG has recommended initiation of a coordinated national program for
low-level waste management and research and development for improved and alternative disposal
methods. IRG Report, supra note 1, at 77-80.
56. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.20, 51.23).
57. 44 Fed. Reg. 61,372 (1979) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R., Parts 50, 51). This notice was in response
to State of Minnesota v. NRC, No. 78-1269 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58. See: IRG Report, supra note 1, at 22.
59. New regulations also risk dilution through interpretation. See e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362 (1979). For
instance, previous applications of the NRC test enforcing radiation standards, which restricts radiation
exposures to a level "as low as reasonably achievable," (see 10 C.F.R. § 20.1 (c) (1979)) have been
translated into a more fluid cost-benefit analysis.
60. NUREG-0326 supra note 42, at 7-9.
61. The EPA first announced its intention to propose environmental radiation protection standards for
high-level radioactive waste at 41 Fed. Reg. 53,363 (1976) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R., Part 260).
At 43 Fed. Reg. 2,223 (1978), the agency reiterated this goal, stating that it had "now developed an
initial formulation of proposed guidance for radioactive waste storage and disposal." In late 1978, the
EPA published its proposed "environmental protection criteria for storage and disposal of all forms
of radioactive waste" and invited public comment (43 Fed. Reg. 53,262 (1978)). The EPA has not
yet published a finalized set of these radiation protection standards, as required by 42 U.S.C.§ 2021(h) (1976).
62. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,262 (1978). Previously, waste disposal had been specifically excluded from EPA
regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 190.02(b) (1979).
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PROSPECT'S FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
FOR NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
Present technology suggests several solutions, some viable, others merely
conjectural. The Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group
on Nuclear Waste Management (hereafter "IRG Report") 63 evaluated six
technical strategies for ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes: placement in
mined repositories, 64 placement in deep ocean sediments, 65 placement in very
deep drill holes, 66 placement in mined cavities leading to rock melting,67 partitioning
of reprocessed reactor wastes and geologic disposal of fission products, 68 and
ejection into space.69 The IRG concluded that each of these techniques requires
further research and development. 70
For the present, the IRG Report has recommended that the first high-level
waste disposal facilities be mined repositories. 71 Although bedded salt has long
been considered the primary medium for permanent waste disposal, the stability,
and hence the safety, of salt repositories is now in question. 72 Thus, the IRG
endorsed geohydrologic analysis of various disposal media in trial disposal
projects. Prior to the selection of permanent depository sites, the IRG suggested
that wastes be stored only in facilities permitting retrieval. 73 Concurrently,
research and development would proceed on alternative disposal options.74
63. The Interagency Review Group was formed by President Carter in 1977. Based upon the DOE's Draft
Report of Task Force for Review of Nuclear Waste Management, it was to outline administrative
policy and programs in radioactive waste management. It was assisted by a Technical Advisory
Committee. The group itself included representatives of DOE, EPA, NRC, Department of Commerce,
Department of the Interior, Department of State, Department of Transportation, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget,
Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of Domestic Affairs
and Policy, National Security Council.
64. Placement in mined repositories is the most advanced technical option. It involves isolation of wastes
in geologic bed rock. Although technology appears competent to make initial site (media) selection,
additional research on waste forms and engineered barriers between the wastes and the environment
is needed. IRG Report, supra note 1, at 37-39, 41-43.
65. Placement in deep ocean sediments is similar to disposal in mined repositories, except that burial takes
place in geologic bedrock below the ocean bed. The necessity of ocean transport is a further hazard
associated with this method of disposal Id., at 35.
66. The very deep hole concept isolates waste in geologic bed rock by lowering wastes through a long
shaft. Questions regarding engineering capability and rock strength which are affected by pressures
and temperatures of radioactive wastes restrain use of this option; however, it may present a feasible
alternative for high-level wastes within 15-20 years. It could not accommodate large volumes of low-level
and transuranic wastes. Id.
67. High-level wastes are placed in underground cavities at great depth. The intense heat from radioactive
decay causes the surrounding rock to melt, eventually dissolving the wastes. Over time the rock
refreezes into a relatively stable molecular matrix. Significant technological and engineering break-throughs
are necessary before rock melting is a feasible option. Again, disposal of large volumes is probably
unrealistic with this proposal. Id.
68. Reprocessing involves separation of reusable plutonium and uranium residues in spent fuel from the
highly irradiated fission waste products. The reusable residues are theoretically recycled into other
reactor fuel cores, while the fission products are permanently stored. This option was ruled out by
the President's Spent Fuel Policy; the IRG recommended vigorous pursuit and legislative action on
this policy. Id., at 99.
69. This exotic solution offers the attractive advantage of permanent isolation of wastes from earth's
environment. However, serious questions of safety and environmental impacts and of energy efficiency
plague its development. This option exists largely in concept only. Id., at 35.
70. Id., at 42-44.
71. Id., at 61. The IRG Report developed an Interim Strategic Planning basis in accord with the National
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(c) (1975)); this program stressed two goals: technological conservation
and steady progress toward long-term disposal.
72. Id. at 38-42. See also: National Waste Terminal Storage Program: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation
Technical Program Plan. Vol. 1., Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, U.S. Department of Energy,
ONWI-19, Feb. 16, 1979 [hereinafter cited as ONWI-191.
73. IRG Report, supra note 1, at 57.
74. Id., at 35-36.
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The DOE, in its Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Management
of Commerically Generated Radioactive Waste (hereafter, "DOE State-
ment"), 75 concurred in the need for further nuclear waste research and in the
use of geologic disposal. As the mass of scientific data deals with geologic
disposal, the DOE placed even greater reliance on geologic disposal than did
the IRG. 76
The DOE advocated immediate action toward creation of a geologic
depository, considering other disposal options as no more supplements to geologic
disposal. 77 Nevertheless, the agency did suggest four other options, in addition
to the six strategies studied by the IRG: chemical resynthesis,78 island
disposal, 79 icesheet disposal80 and reverse-well disposal. 81
Aside from the development of suitable nuclear waste technology, a second
constraint on resolution of the waste-disposal dilemma is posed by political
dissension. Scientific debate over the existence or potential development of
technologically safe disposal methods82 translates into a political clash stymieing
legislative resolution of the issue. Reliance upon assertions that dependable
waste technology is presently available, moreover, is often disputed on the
basis of the repeated leakages at existing disposal sites.83 Such discord is
75. Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive
Wastes, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/EIS-0046-D, April, 1979 [hereinafter cited as DOE
Statement ].
76. Id. at 1.1. See also: Earth Science Technical Plan for Mined Geologic Disposal of Radioactive
Waste, Office of Nuclear Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Geological Survey,
U.S. Department of the Interior, TID-29018 (Draft), January, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Technical
Plan I.
77. DOE Statement, supra note 75, at 1.7. The DOE has proposed that the earliest waste facilities be
test facilities for research purposes. See Technical Plan, supra note 76, at 50.
78. The DOE defines this option as a variation of geologic disposal. It involves alteration of nuclear wastes
into synthetic minerals chemically designed for compatibility with the host rock. Resynthesis would
render wastes inert and insoluble, enhancing the safety factor. Potential reduction in risk must be
balanced against the need for substantial research and costs of implementation. DOE Statement,
supra note 75, at 1.23-1.24.
79. Island disposal refers to conventional geologic disposal in stable crystalline rock formations beneath
deserted islands. The necessity of sea transportation complicates use of this option. Id., at 1.26.
80. Although disposal of nuclear waste beneath polar ice-sheets offers the advantage of remoteness from
population centers, the uncertain interactions between glacial masses and nuclear wastes pose a major
obstacle to the future of this disposal option Id., at 1.27.
81. Reverse-well disposal comprehends two distinct techniques. In the first liquid waste is injected into a
porous rock layer completely overlain by impermeable rock. The second method proposes injection of
a mixture of waste, clay, cement and other substances into shale; the wastes are entrapped in that
shale stratum as the mixture solidifies. These techniques are employed by the oil and gas industry,
indicating technological feasibility. Nevertheless, they are impracticable to the extent that the volume
of low-level and transuranic waste could not be accommodated. Twenty-eight states either regulate or
prohibit this disposal method. Id., at 1.28-1.29.
82. NUREG-0412 supra note 5, at 21.
83. Massive leakages have been reported at the Hanford, Washington Reservation, one of three military
waste disposal sites. Minor leakages have been detected at the Savannah River Plant at Aiken, South
Carolina; the Idaho Falls, Idaho site, providing storage for about three percent of defense wastes, has
experienced no leakage. Metlay, NUREG-0412 id., at 1; Jaksetic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive
High-level Waste Management, 9 Envt'i L. J. 347 (1979).
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evidenced by state statutes limiting repository development. 84 The fundamental
question is one of risk assessment. 85
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
From the previous discussion it is clear that resolution of the nuclear waste
dilemma will be achieved only in response to a strong, legislated catalyst. Only
a potent stimulus can effect replacement of the present fragmented regulatory
scheme by a comprehensive framework for waste disposal.
Though controversial, an initial measure is the imposition of an immediate
moratorium on licensing further construction and operation of nuclear reactors
pending the opening of temporary waste-storage facilities. A linkage between
licensing of nuclear power plants and disposal of their waste products would
pressure private industry into partially accepting the burden of developing
waste technology. Imposition of a moratorium would hasten technological
advances in feasible storage and disposal methods.
Another advantage of such a moratorium would be official recognition of
the presently de facto suspension of nuclear plant construction, as it would
dramatize the need for a legislated waste policy. Given the present lack of
actual storage space for future nuclear wastes, generation of more wastes from
plants now under construction would be logistically imprudent. Hopefully, this
moratorium would also spur concentrated development of renewable energy
resources.
Secondly, any legislated waste-management program 86 must clearly de-
lineate responsibilities among the federal agencies involved. 87 The existing
decentralization of policy formation and the lack of communication among
relevant federal, state and local agencies calls for, at the very least, a thoughtful
reorganization of the supervisory agencies. Such revamping would eliminate
overlapping functions and assign specific tasks according to a realistic time-
table.88 A second, frequently suggested alternative is the creation of an entirely
new agency, free of the promotional philosophy of the NRC. This proposal is
flawed by the transitional period required for the creation of any new agency.
84. State statutes regarding limitations on high-level-waste disposal fall into three general categories: laws
banning construction of repositories within the state's borders, laws requiring state approval prior to
construction of repositories within the state's borders, laws controlling various aspects of disposal within
the state. For express prohibitions on waste disposal, see the following category one statutes: Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 14.528 (351) (Callaghan Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 469.525 (1977). In the second
category see: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 1160.72 (West Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 34-21-1.1
(Allen Smith 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 10.6501 (Equity Supp. 1979). Included in the various regulations
comprising category three are Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-409d (West Supp. 1979), Ga. Code Ann.§ 88-1302 (b) (1) and § 88-1306.1 (Harrison Supp. 1979), Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116C.73 (West Supp.
1979), Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 69-5817- 69-5821 (Allen Smith Supp. 1977).
Statutes in two other states link construction of nuclear reactors to resolution of waste-disposal
problems; see Cal. Publ. Res. Code § 25,524.2 (West 1977) and Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 10.253-10.256
(West Supp. 1979).
85. Bupp supra note 19, at 128. Such considerations have delayed the projected completion date for a
high-level-waste repository from the original date of 1985 first to 1988 and now in the President's
proposed fifteen-year plan (see note 3, supra) to 1995. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
86. A precise definition of nuclear waste, as generated at each step of the nuclear fuel cycle, is prerequisite
to reconsideration of statutory grants of authority, however. Extension of the regulatory agency's
authority to military wastes also presents a consideration.
87. The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island criticized the absence of a
"well-thought-out, integrated system" within the NRC, recommending a "total restructuring of the
agency." N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1979, at A22, col. 1.
88. For a suggested timetable, see ONWI-19 supra note 72, at VI-1.
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Therefore, a comprehensive waste-management plan should aim at reform
of the federal regulatory network. To avoid uncoordinated agency action,
regular inter-agency conferences should be established for review of nuclear
waste policy. Meeting at monthly intervals, such conferences should assure
steady progress according to an established timetable.89 They would provide
exchange of technical assistance and information and delegate specific
responsibilities to designated administrators. Finally, published reports of these
conferences should be made available to the public.
A third legislative need is funding for intensive research and development
on waste disposal. Disposal methods for all types of nuclear waste-including
tailings, low-level waste, transuranic waste, high-level waste and spent fuel-must
be developed. This research should be consolidated under the aegis of one
agency-the DOE.90 To achieve the most expeditious solution possible, the
United States should actively pursue international exchange of nuclear waste
technology.
Further study of the reprocessing option is also needed so that a determination
as to its utility and safety may be made. The ramifications of reprocessing,
which are largely political in nature, must be explored in the meantime as a
basis for final decision. At present, plans for waste disposal should proceed
under the assumption that reprocessing is not an option in accordance with
the President's spent fuel policy. 91 A stalemate on this issue must not impede
progress towards an ultimate solution to the problem of disposal of nuclear
wastes.
A fourth legislative objective should be authorization of regionally based,
interim storage facilities. 92 Such facilities would be temporary in nature,
permitting retrievability upon final selection of permanent disposal methods.
Given the present state of technology, early storage facilities should be geologic
repositories and be sited in geologically safe areas, remote from population
centers.
Finally, legislation regarding waste policy must effectively defuse political
opposition, a major obstacle to it adoption. Channels for expression of public
opinion and for arbitration of disagreements are vital to political consensus.
Reduction of dissent is imperative, for in certain areas the overriding need for
environmentally safe disposal facilities may dictate site selection over local
opposition. Use of an absolute state veto on this could bring any federal waste
program to a standstill.
Thus, an effective waste disposal program must include a formal arbitration
process for resolution of disputes over selection of disposal sites. A task force,
composed of representatives of the federal regulatory agencies (DOE, EPA,
NRC), the state or tribal government 93 involved, and local citizen groups,
should be appointed by the governor of the state in which disposal is proposed.
89. Preferably, a rough schedule would be set up by Congress, specifying target dates for major objectives
like the opening of temporary, long-term storage facilities. A more detailed timetable would be
established by the agencies involved.
90. At present certain research and development functions are assigned to other agencies, specifically the
EPA and the U.S. Geological Survey, which is a department within the Department of the Interior.
91. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
92. See IRG Report, supra note 1, at 49; Technical Plan at 50.
93. Nuclear waste sites located on lands owned by Indian tribes require approval of the tribal, as opposed
to state government involved. See the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7942 (West Supp. 1978).
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This task force would conduct public hearings regarding feasibility of nuclear
waste disposal at the proposed site. If the task force cannot agree on the
proposed site, both the DOE and NRC, as well as the task force itself, must
immediately report to Congress regarding the advisability of the disputed site
selection. Within thirty to sixty days thereafter, both houses of Congress must
vote, ultimately deciding whether disposal facilities will be built at the disputed
site.
PENDING LEGISLATION
Numerous legislative proposals on the topic of nuclear waste management
have been introduced in the 96th Congress. However, at this writing none of
the bills have been voted out of committee. Furthermore, almost without
exception, the bills address specific issues94 within the problem of waste
management. Adoption of any of these specialized bills would continue the
same ineffective, piecemeal treatment that has been given waste management
in the past. The comprehensive legislative enactment that is imperative seems
far from passage in either house.
There are two proposals that approach the level of comprehensiveness that
is required. The first is the Nuclear Waste Management Act of 1979, H.R.
3298, introduced by Representative Jeffords.95 This bill proposes establishment
of a new independent executive agency, the Nuclear Waste Management
Authority (NWMA).
The NWMA would have sole responsibility for developing a plan for the
decontamination, storage and disposal of all nuclear wastes including surplus,
obsolete or abandoned radioactive facilities. The Secretary of Energy and the
NWMA would conduct the research necessary for the Authority to exercise
its responsibilities. Duties of the NWMA would include directing the EPA to
promulgate health and safety standards and directing the NRC to license the
siting, design and construction of waste facilities.
Adopting a plan for inter-agency cooperation, the bill requires the Department
of Defense, the DOE and the NRC to furnish the Authority with a complete
inventory of any nuclear wastes or remains of radioactive materials in their
possession or in the possession of private parties. The Authority would be
required to report annually to the President, the Congress and the International
Atomic Energy Commission regarding any loss of fuel or wastes.
The bill also directs the Authority to monitor the licensing process. In the
event that disapproval of radioactive waste storage sites creates a shortage of
storage capacity, the Authority must determine whether licensing of utilization,
production and reprocessing facilities should continue.
94. Various categories of legislation addressing specific issues of waste management were introduced in
the first session of the 96th Congress; they include:
State participation in site selection: H.R. 1070, H.R. 1791, H.R. 2365, H.R. 2762, H.R. 3298,
H.R. 5923, S. 594, S. 701, S. 1360, S. 1443, S. 1521.
Transportation of nuclear wastes: H.R. 3692, H.R. 4455, S. 685.
Moratorium on licensing construction and/or operation of new facilities: H.R. 3581, H.R. 4455,
S. 1178.
Demonstration or trial disposal sites and further research and development: H.R. 1852, H.R.
4019, H.R. 4361, H.R. 4818.
Greater NRC licensing authority over disposal facilities for various types of waste: H.R. 2586,
H.R. 2611, H.R. 5809, H.R. 6116, H.R. 6212, S. 797, S. 798, S. 1521.
Other legislative proposals involving nuclear waste management: H.R. 3010, H.R. 3193, H.R.
3305, H.R. 4174, S. 798, S. 1389.
95. H.R. 3298. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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This bill propounds public hearings in each state affected by proposed
selection of waste sites. This scheme provides that a governor may object to
the Authority's choice of any nuclear-waste site located within his state.
However, the bill also requires that the Director of the Authority designate
such sites as are necessary for storage and permanent disposal of wastes,
regardless of veto by the governor involved.
The bill calls for several transfers of authority. All functions, powers and
duties of the DOE relating to wastes are assigned to the Authority. All EPA
regulatory and licensing powers with regard to disposal of nuclear wastes are
turned over to the NRC.
Lastly, the bill requires the NWMA, DOE, EPA and the NRC to make
annual reports to the President and Congress concerning their efforts toward
waste disposal. Those agencies, in addition, must prepare detailed statements
of their goals and plans for the ensuing two years.
The primary defect in the Jeffords bill is the creation of a new executive
agency. This would cause an intolerable delay in action on nuclear waste
management. Further, the express delineation of agencies' responsibilities that
is imperative would not be adequately achieved through adoption of this
legislative scheme. A less grievous shortcoming of this bill is the transfer of
all regulatory and licensing powers of the EPA concerning nuclear waste
disposal to the NRC. The EPA should retain the responsibility for enforcing
radiation standards. The proposal is further crippled by its failure to provide
definite timetables with which to work. Additionally, the bill would benefit
through incorporation of a moratorium on new reactor licensing, pending
operation of a waste storage facility.
The Nuclear Waste Management Reorganization Act of 197996 suggests
an alternative to an entirely new executive agency.97 The proposal establishes
a fifteen-member Nuclear Waste Management Planning Council as an independent
instrumentality of the executive branch. Comprised of elected officials of state
or local governments or of Indian tribes, the Council would provide input on
federal nuclear waste policy.
96. S. 742. 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
97. Another less successful attempt at a comprehensive legislative plan was introduced by Representative
Goldwater, H.R. 4019: The Nuclear Waste Management, Research, Development and Demonstration
Act of 1979. The bill directs the Secretary of Energy to make a determination regarding a repository
site for spent fuel and nuclear waste. The Secretary would also be responsible for developing technology
for design, construction and operation of the repository. Further, the DOE would dictate the procedure
for transporting nuclear waste to the repositories. The Secretary of the Department of Transportation
(DOT) would issue the requisite regulations for shipment of the wastes.
The NRC would have two years to reach a decision on approval and licensing after receiving
an application from DOE. The repository would have to be in operation by September 30, 1988, with
the EPA responsible for promulgating standards for environmentally safe storage of the wastes. The
DOE would have to inform the governor of the appropriate state of study regarding potential and
final site selection. If the state objects to a federal nuclear waste repository within its borders, the
DOE must resolve the matter with the state. In the event that no resolution can be reached, the
matter would be referred to both houses of Congress for review. Only if both houses, by concurrent
resolution, determine within sixty days that the proposed site balances both state and national interests
would the project proceed.
The major flaw of this piece of legislation is the failure to provide public hearings and a formal
arbitration process in the event of state rejection of the repository site. The bill calls for the DOE
to promulgate regulations for shipment of nuclear wastes; however, the DOE lacks the technical
expertise in this area. That responsibility more aptly falls under the auspices of the NRC. The timetable
suggested in the bill are, unfortunately, too optimistic and should be modified.
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A Nuclear Waste Coordinating Committee would also be established by
this legislation. Representatives of various federal agencies and
departments-including the Waste Management Planning Council, DOE, NRC
and the EPA, 98 would serve as members of the Committee. Chaired by the
delegate from the DOE, the Committee would coordinate the activities of the
federal agencies represented on the Committee and thereby minimize duplication
of effort and unnecessary delay in nuclear waste management programs. The
Committee would also prepare Repository Development Reports and an annual
Nuclear Waste Management Plan.
This proposal requires the Committee to notify the governor of any state
which is under study by any federal agency or department as a possible site
for a nuclear waste repository. Once the governor receives such notification,
(s)he has the authority to establish a Nuclear Waste Repository Review Panel
to facilitate state and local participation in the planning and development of
such a repository. This Panel will review the Committee Repository Development
Report. If the Panel does not approve of the repository site, it may raise
formal objections with Congress. Within sixty days of submission of the
Committee Report and of the Panel's objections, Congress may, by concurrent
resolution, determine that the proposed development of that nuclear waste
repository equitably balances state, local and national interests. Only with such
Congressional approval may the federal government begin emplacing wastes
in any repository not approved by the local review panel.
Although the bill approaches the requisite level of depth and breadth herein
advocated, it contains a few specific flaws. The proposal fails to address the
critically neglected issue of research and development, especially with respect
to the reprocessing option. The frequency of Committee meetings, as well as
the inclusion of appropriate timetables, is also omitted from this legislative
proposal. Further, it is questionable whether the bill's delineation of responsibilities
among federal agencies is sufficiently clear to be effectual. Apparently, such
unblurred delegation of authority can only be achieved through explicit statutory
determination. A moratorium on further licensing of reactors, pending the
opening of a nuclear waste repository, should also be considered.
Neither the Nuclear Waste Management Act nor the Nuclear Waste
Management Reorganization Act are as all-inclusive as expediency requires.
However, because of its proposed creation of a new executive agency, the
Jeffords bill would work as a bottleneck within the already complex regulatory
scheme surrounding nuclear waste management. While the other proposal lacks
many imperative policy considerations, adoption of the Nuclear Waste
Management Reorganization Act would be a positive step toward an acceptable
regulatory strategy in nuclear waste management.
98. Additional members of the Committee would include representatives from the Council on Enviornmental
Quality, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Interior, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of State, and the head of any other federal agency or department
designated by the President.
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CONCLUSION
Advocates of nuclear power insist that the environmental consequences of
present energy sources pose a greater ecological threat than does nuclear
energy 99 and that increasing reliance on foreign energy sources menaces
American stability and independence. 100 Detractors question the actual potential
of nuclear energy as the savior of the American energy crisis. They object to
the moral and philosophical implications of bequeathing to future generations
risks of uncalculated proportion in order to satisfy the present generation's
demands. 10 1 A balance between these two viewpoints must be struck. The
hazard posed to human and environmental survival must be weighed against
the immediate needs for economic security.
The continued production of commercial radioactive waste is becoming an
increasingly more significant constraint on generation of nuclear power at a
time of rising energy costs and constricted energy supplies. It is an issue
demanding an immediate, yet considered, legislative response. Congress must
organize a political framework in which the inherent risks can be equitably
distributed with a minimum of dissension. Regardless of the ultimate decision
on nuclear power's future, an environmentally wise and politically acceptable
management program must be developed and implemented posthaste.
Judy L. Ostrander*
Lorelie S. Masters**
*B.A., Western Michigan University, 1978; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame
Law School, 1981.
**A.B., Georgetown University, 1977; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law
School, 1981.
99. Bodansky and Schmidt, The Nuclear Alternative, 30 Mercer L. Rev. 395 (1979).
100. This issue, of course, cuts across idiological lines. See Stobaugh and Yergin supra note 19, at 1-4.
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supra note 99, at 396.
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